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Abstract
The vague notion of "probabilistic patents" is formalized through
a model which combines real option theory and a fuzzy method-
ology. The imprecise estimates the patent holder possesses about
her future profits, the validity and scope of the patent, the litiga-
tion costs, the court’s decision etc. under a regime of imperfect
enforcement of property rights are specified modelling uncertainty
with fuzzy sets. Such methodology is embedded within a real op-
tion approach, where the value of a patent includes the option
value of litigation. We study how the value of a patent is aﬀected
by the timing and incidence of litigation. The main results are
compared with the empirical findings of previous results.
Keywords: probabilistic patents; real options; litigation risk;
imprecise information; fuzzy sets.
A previous version of this paper was presented at the 12th
International Conference on Real Options: Theory and Applica-
tions.
1 Introduction
A central theme in the recent debate on patent reform is the need for
policy-makers to explicitly recognize the policy dimension of legal un-
certainty. Virtually, all property rights contain some elements of uncer-
tainty and both litigation and settlement decisions occur in an environ-
ment characterized by imprecise information ([4],[26],[22],[12]). Fuzzy
boundaries of the patent property right have been identified as a main
cause of the recent explosion of patent litigation ([5],[6],[7]). The ac-
knowledgement of the eﬀects of uncertainty is outlined as an important
element that law should accurately take into account. Recently, the Eu-
ropean Commission has started studying the feasibility of alternative
schemes against patent litigation risks, including insurance, in view of
the dramatic explosion of patent litigation ([9]). As far as patent policy
is concerned, it is emphasized that the eﬀects of uncertainty should be
incorporated in regulation and enforcement rules. This issue requires an
accurate quantitative determination of the patent value. In this paper
we propose a new comprehensive model, focusing on the diﬀerent sources
of uncertainty. Our main result is a valuation formula for patents which
can be used for practical applications.
A patent is usually defined as a right to make exclusive use of an
innovation at a predetermined cost for a predetermined period of time,
i.e. the life of the patent. The patent holder may commercialize some
products or licence her technology or use it for further developments. As
1
such it is viewed as a real option, which is considered a most suitable
way to model patents nowadays ([11]). The interpretation of patents
as real options presupposes an enforceable property right. Yet, an in-
creased number of patents have registered a high frequency of disputes
and litigation involving patent holders and alleged infringers, so that
the risk that a patent will be declared invalid is substantial. There is a
wide variation across patents in their exposure to risk: as [19] and [2]
have shown through detailed empirical evidence, for high-value patents
and specific types of patentees the litigation risk can be quite high, in
some cases almost oﬀsetting what would otherwise be the R&D incentive
provided by patent ownership. Bessen and Meurer [7] in a most compre-
hensive empirical research have found that technology that rely heavily
on software are vexed by huge patent litigation costs, so that "the patent
system has turned from a source of net subsidy to R&D to a net tax"
([6], page 1) Moreover, "roughly half of all litigated patents are found to
be invalid, including some of great commercial significance" ([20], page
76). Thus, because of uncertainty in the enforcement of property rights,
it has been stated that " a patent does not confer upon its owner the
right to exclude but rather a right to try to exclude by asserting the
patent in court" ([20], page 75). Accordingly, the clarification of the
norms about intellectual property right has been indicated as the main
challenge for lawyers and politicians in the next decades ([18]).
Because of imperfect enforcement of property rights, most patents
represent highly uncertain or probabilistic property rights. Lemley and
Shapiro ([20]) use the term probabilistic patents. Modelling patents as
probabilistic rights requires to rethink how to reform the patent granting
process and the patent litigation procedures.
In this paper we translate the vague notion of probabilistic patents
into a mathematical model, where the valuation of patents can be per-
formed by a combination of real options and a fuzzy methodology. In
order to capture the notion of vagueness about the validity and scope
of patents under a regime of imperfect enforcement of property rights,
we introduce a notion of uncertainty, alternative to probability theory,
through the theory of fuzzy sets. In this way, we are able to capture
the vague and imprecise estimates the patent holder possesses about
her future profits, the validity of the patent, the litigation costs, the
court’s decision. Moreover, we embed such methodology within a real
option approach, where the value of a patent includes the option value
of litigation.
There are various papers applying the theory of real options to the
valuation of patents although very few of them introduce the patent en-
forcement process explicitly. [23] first estimated the distribution of the
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returns earned from holding patents as options which are renewed at
alternative ages and require renewal fees. [8] builds on [23] and derives
empirical predictions on the relationship between patents and market
uncertainty. [25] implements a simulation model to value patents as com-
plex options, taking into account uncertainty in the cost-to-completion
of the project and the possibility of abandoning the project. [27] models
sequential real options, analyzing the patenting decision and its eﬀects
in research, development and commercialization. [28], [17], [14] also
investigate the patenting decision under technological and market un-
certainty with competing firms. None of the above-mentioned papers
introduce the risk of litigation. To the best of our knowledge, the only
analyses of the option value of litigation are [21] and [3]. However, [21]
is mainly focused on the timing and incidence of patent litigation and is
concerned with the empirical estimates of patent litigation. [3] develops
at length both the theory and the numerical implementation of some
jump-diﬀusion models, where the risk of litigation is exogenously given
and negatively aﬀects the value of the patent in the form of disconti-
nuities or jumps in the value process. He also addresses some issues of
endogenous patent risk through a model where the patent holder pos-
sesses full knowledge about the probability distribution of the litigation
risk.
Our paper is the first that combines a real option to litigate with a
fuzzy valuation. The need for a fuzzy valuation comes from the com-
mon observation that patent claims are sometimes vaguely defined, the
outcomes of a trial are diﬃcult to forecast, legal costs are not easily
predictable, it may be years before litigation is concluded, there may
be divergence in parties’ expectations about the court decision, future
cash flows from commercialization are imprecise. Although the existing
literature has identified the main determinants of litigation, it has not
investigated how the value of a patent is aﬀected by the timing and in-
cidence of litigation under an appropriate framework of uncertainty. In
this paper a novel approach to patents evaluation is presented and is
based on applying fuzzy sets and fuzzy arithmetic to capture imprecise
information in a way which is suitable for applicability too. Section 2
presents the model of a patent under imperfect enforcement of property
rights, where the relevant parameters are fuzzy. The model is solved
analytically for infinitely lived patents and in Section 3 the main results
are compared with the empirical findings of previous studies. Finally,
Section 4 concludes.
3
2 The fuzzy valuation method
In what follows let us introduce the basic method that is used in our
application. For our purpose, let us introduce the essential definitions
here and refer to the classical literature on fuzzy-stochastic theory, start-
ing from [29], [15], [16], [24]. A fuzzy number is a fuzzy set (depicted
with tilde) of the real line R, which is commonly defined by a normal,
upper-semicontinuous, fuzzy convex membership function μ : R→ [0, 1]
of compact support. Fuzzy numbers can be interpreted as possibility
distributions. While in classical set theory an element either belongs
to a set or does not belong to a set, in fuzzy set theory we allow for a
gradation of belonging, that can describe vague, imprecise or inaccurate
knowledge about some estimates or data.
The γ-cut of a fuzzy number is given by: eμγ = {xR | eμ(x) = γ},
γ(0, 1], and eμ0 = cl {xR | eμ(x) = 0}, where cl denotes the closure of an
interval. Let us write the closed intervals as eμγ = £eμ−γ , eμ+γ ¤ for γ[0, 1],so
that eμ−γ denotes the left-hand side and eμ+γ the right-hand side of the γ-cut.
Given two fuzzy numbers, eμ and eη, the partial order % on fuzzy numbers
can be defined such that eμ % eη means that eμ−γ ≥ eη−γ and eμ+γ ≥ eη+γ for all
γ[0, 1]. The arithmetic operations on two fuzzy numbers can be defined
in the standard way, in terms of the γ-cuts for γ[0, 1]. In particular,
for fuzzy numbers eμ and eη the addition and subtraction eμ ± eη and the
scalar multiplication aμ, where a ≥ 0, are fuzzy numbers as follows:
(eμ+ eη)γ = £eμ−γ + eη−γ , eμ+γ + eη+γ ¤,
(eμ− eη)γ = £eμ−γ − eη+γ , eμ+γ − eη−γ ¤,
(aeμ)γ = £aeμ−γ , aeμ+γ ¤.
Moreover, multiplication between two fuzzy numbers eμ and eη is given
by:
(eμeη)γ = h(eμeη)−γ , (eμeη)+γ i,
where (eμeη)−γ = min £eμ−γ eη−γ ,eμ−γ eη+γ ,eμ+γ eη−γ ,eμ+γ eη+γ ¤
and (eμeη)+γ = max £eμ−γ eη−γ ,eμ−γ eη+γ ,eμ+γ eη−γ ,eμ+γ eη+γ ¤.
Division between two fuzzy numbers eμ and eη is given by:³
?μ
?η
´
γ
=
h
(?μ?η )
−
γ , (
?μ
?η )
+
γ
i
,
where (?μ?η )
−
γ = min
h
?μ−γ
?η−γ
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−
γ
?η+γ
, ?μ
+
γ
?η−γ
, ?μ
+
γ
?η+γ
i
and (?μ?η )
+
γ = max
h
?μ−γ
?η−γ
, ?μ
−
γ
?η+γ
, ?μ
+
γ
?η−γ
, ?μ
+
γ
?η+γ
i
.
Let (Ω,Π, A) be a probability space. A fuzzy-number-valued mapgX
is called a fuzzy random variable if
n
(ω, x)  Ω×R | eX(ω)(x) ≥ γo is
measurable for all γ[0, 1]. It is called integrably bounded if both ω →
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fXγ−(ω) and ω → fXγ+(ω) are integrable for all γ[0, 1]. The expectation
E( eX) of the integrably bounded fuzzy random variable eX is also defined
by a fuzzy number
E( eX)(x) = supγ(0,1)minnγ,1E( ?X)γ(x)o,xR,
where E( eX)γ = hRΩ fXγ−(ω)dΠ(ω), RΩ fXγ+(ω)dΠ(ω)i, γ[0, 1].
Let us now introduce the valuation method, which is based on fuzzy
variables (see, f.e. [10]) along the lines in [1].
Suppose an innovator owns a patent allowing her to generate additional
cash flows from commercializing some product. For simplicity, let us as-
sume that the protection period is infinite, which facilitates the deriva-
tion of a closed-form solution. Commercialization is related with some
expected income which fluctuates randomly. This income can be either
in the form of royalties or in the form of increased revenues from the abil-
ity to exclude others from the market. Let P denote the net cash flow
resulting from the patent, which is described by the following stochastic
dynamics:
dPt = Pt(μdt+ σdWt)
where μ < r is the appreciation rate, r is the risk-free interest rate
and σ is the volatility (μR , σ > 0) andWt is a standardWiener process
([14]). In particular, let
nePto
t≥0
be a fuzzy stochastic process, which is
specified as follows:ePt(ω)(x) = maxn1− | x−Pt(ω)cPt(ω) |, 0o, 0 < c < 1,
that is, the fuzzy random variable ePt is of the triangular type, with
centre Pt(ω), and left-width and right-width cPt(ω). A triangular fuzzy
number with centre Pt(ω) may be seen as a fuzzy quantity "approx-
imately equal to Pt(ω)". Observe that the fuzziness in the process
increases if c is bigger. The choice of a triangle-type shape is not re-
strictive at all and is mainly adopted to facilitate computation. More-
over, it has a nice interpretation, in that represents the net cash flows
under pessimistic (i.e. left side) and optimistic (i.e. right side) es-
timates. The γ-cuts of ePt(ω)(x) are eP±t,γ(ω) = h eP−t,γ(ω), eP+t,γ(ω)i =
[(1− (1− γ)c)Pt(ω), (1 + (1− γ)c)Pt(ω)].
However, as argued in [20], the value of a patent depends not only
on the uncertainty about the commercial significance of the innovation
being patented, but also on the uncertainty about the validity and scope
of the legal right being granted. The latter introduces the notion of
"probabilistic patents". A patent does not confer an absolute right to
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exclude others from infringement; on the other hand, the actual scope
(for which patent law often allows to use vague claim language; see
[6]) and validity of a patent right and even whether the patent right will
withstand litigation at all are uncertain and contingent issues. Therefore,
following [21], a patent can be described as a portfolio consisting of two
assets: an asset paying a stochastic cash flow P and an option to litigate.
Note however, that [21] considers the case of a patent infringement (and
ultimately the uncertainty over the validity of the patent), while our
analysis applies to challenge suits too. Indeed, we compute both the
option value of litigation held by the challenger, his threshold value
and the value of the patent for the patent-holder. Since the option to
litigate/sue can be exercised anytime prior to patent expiration, the
decision to litigate can be modeled within a real option analysis.
2.1 The patent value
Let us formalize the notion of a probabilistic patent. Based on the alleged
infringement, a challenger may decide to litigate at any time τ(t,∞)
and if successful receives a fraction θ of future net cash flows, which is
determined by court and not known in advance by the two parties (if un-
successful, nothing is received). Litigation may end up being successful
or not: let p denote the probability that the challenger will be successful,
as from the beliefs of the patent-holder. In what follows, we assume that
both θ and p are fuzzy numbers. It is in practice impossible to have an
ex-ante absolutely correct estimate of the parameters that describe the
structure of litigation. Thus, imprecision in such future estimates de-
pends on how abstract or vague patent claims and boundaries are and is
formalized through fuzzy sets. Specifically, eθ(x) = max©1− | x−θbθ |, 0ª,
that is, it has a symmetric triangle-type shape, with centre θ and width
bθ, and ep(x) = maxn1− | x−pdp |, 0o, that is, it has a symmetric triangle-
type shape, with centre p and width dp, where 0 < b, d and b+d−bd < 1.
Finally, let eLi, i = 1, 2 denote the litigation costs incurred by the patent-
holder (i = 1) and the challenger (i = 2). Both are fuzzy numbers, so
that eLi = maxn1− | x−LifiLi |, 0o that is, it has a symmetric triangle-type
shape, with centre Li and width fiLi,where 0 < fi < 1.
We can specify the γ-cuts, that is,eθ±γ = heθ−γ ,eθ+γ i = [(1− (1− γ)b)θ, (1 + (1− γ)b)θ];ep±γ = £ep−γ , ep+γ ¤ = [(1− (1− γ)d)p, (1 + (1− γ)d)p];fLi,±γ = heL−i,γ, eL+i,γi = [(1− (1− γ)fi)Li, (1 + (1− γ)fi)Li].
All agents are assumed to follow a policy of value-maximization. The
optimal litigation time τ∗ is chosen by the challenger in response to the
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resolution of uncertainty related to Pt over time. The optimal stopping
time τ∗ is defined as the first time Pt exceeds a critical level which is
suﬃciently high to justify the cost of litigation. More specifically, we
will find τ∗ = inf
£
t : P∗±γ < Pt
¤
, where P∗±γ is obtained in Proposition
1.
The value of the patent under the risk of litigation for the patent-
holder can be specified as follows:eVγ(Pt, t) =
= supτ(t,∞)E
©R∞
t e
−r(s−t)Psds−
R∞
τ e
−r(s−t)(pθPs)ds− e−r(τ−t)L1
ª
.
which is equivalent to the expected present value of cash flows from
commercialization minus the option to litigate gained by the challenger,
minus the present value of additional litigation costs.
We can prove Proposition 1, where the value of the patent is specified
in terms of the both ends of the γ-cuts:
Proposition 1 The payoﬀ from commercializing under imperfect patent
protection due to the risk of litigation is given by:eV ±γ (Pt, t) =∙
?P−t,γ
r−μ − fL1,+γ − (pθΠt)+γr−μ , ?P+t,γr−μ − fL1,−γ − (pθPt)−γr−μ ¸, if Pt > P∗±γ ,∙
?P−t,γ
r−μ − (fL1,+γ + εε−1fL2,+γ )(( PtP∗−γ )ε), ?P+t,γr−μ − (fL1,−γ + εε−1fL2,−γ )(( PtP∗+γ )ε)
¸
,
if Pt ≤ P∗±γ ,
where P∗±γ = (r−μ)−1
h
(1−(1−γ)f2)L2
θp(1+(1−γ)(b+d+bd(1−γ)) ,
(1+(1−γ)f2)L2
θp(1−(1−γ)(b+d−bd(1−γ))
i
and  = 1
2
− μσ2 +
p
( μσ2−
1
2
)2 + 2rσ2 > 1.
Proof. It follows from standard arguments in the theory of real options
(see [11]), in view of the fact that the option value of litigation held by
the challenger and denoted by eO±γ (Pt, t) satisfies the following partial
diﬀerential equation:
1
2
σ2P 2t ∂
2
Pt
eO±γ + μPt∂Pt eO±γ − r eO±γ − (pθΠt)±γ = 0
with the final condition −fL2,±γ if Pt > P∗±γ . Then P∗±γ is obtained as the
solution of this Cauchy problem, if we take into account the expression
for γ-cuts of fuzzy numbers. Finally, eV ±γ (Pt, t) can be easily obtained
observing that eV ±γ (Pt, t) = ?P±t,γr−μ − eO±γ (Pt, t)− E he−r(τ∗−t)(fL1,+γ + fL2,+γ )i
It is apparent that the patent holder’s value is smaller under the risk
of litigation than it would be under perfect patent protection (equivalent
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to p = θ = Li = 0). P∗±γ represents the critical value between the stop-
ping region where litigation occurs (for Pt > P∗±γ ) and the continuation
region (for Pt < P∗±γ ). Observe that P∗±γ is included in the set
(r−μ)
−1
h
(1−f2)L2
θp(1+b+d+bd) ,
(1+f2)L2
θp(1−b−d+bd)
i
which is positive. Note that because of the fuzzy modelling litigation oc-
curs if the cash flow resulting from the patent is larger than P∗+γ ,while
if it is less that P∗−γ then waiting becomes the optimal strategy. In the
intermediate range we cannot conclude for any of the two occurrences,
so that this area will be called the "indecision area".
3 The role of imprecise information: results and
discussion
In this section a numerical implementation is performed to evaluate the
role of imprecise information on litigation decisions. To this purpose, let
us concentrate on the characteristics of the critical value and perform
a sensitivity analysis. The membership function for eP∗ is plotted in
Figures 1-6. Observe that the shape of the critical value is asymmetric
to the right, implying that litigation is postponed on average in the fuzzy
model in comparison with the non-fuzzy model, where the critical value
is the crisp value P∗±1 = (r−μ)−1
L2
θp . Since on average the fuzzy threshold
value is larger than without fuzziness, the decision about litigation in a
fuzzy context diﬀers from the decision in a non-fuzzy model.
It is useful to study the eﬀects of the model parameters on the critical
value. Figures 1-6 allow us to view the results graphically. It is shown
how the fuzzy shape of the critical value changes as L2 changes (Figure
1), as p changes (Figure 3), as θ changes (Figure 5). The dashed curves
represent the shape of the critical value for the highest value of the
parameters, the thin solid curve for the intermediate value and the thick
solid curve gives the lowest value. For γ = 1 we obtain the crisp value,
which is increasing in L2 (Figure 1) and decreasing in p (Figure 3) and
θ(Figure 5). Therefore, the challenger hastens litigation if his cost of
litigation decreases, the probability of successful litigation increases, the
fraction of future net cash-flows increases. Notice that the shape of the
critical value is thinner (i.e. there is less dispersion from the crisp value)
for the parameter values which have a positive impact on the challenger’s
value, it is thicker (i.e. there is more dispersion from the crisp value) for
the parameter values which have a negative impact on the challenger’s
value. It implies that the "indecision area" about litigation becomes
bigger for the parameter values reducing the challenger’s value.
Figures 2,4,6 display the impact of "fuzziness". In Figure 2 an in-
crease in fuzziness is measured by an increase in f2, in Figure 4 by an
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increase in d and in Figure 6 by an increase in b. The dashed curves
represent the shape of the critical value for the highest value of the pa-
rameters, the thin solid curve for the intermediate value and the thick
solid curve gives the lowest value. Note that as fuzziness increases, the
fuzzy shape of the critical value enlarges, the membership function be-
comes asymmetric and shifts to the right, implying that for conjectures
on the left side (optimistic regarding the litigation costs, pessimistic re-
garding the probability of success and the fraction of future cash flows)
the decision is not aﬀected much by an increase in fuzziness, while for
conjectures on the right side (pessimistic regarding the litigation costs,
optimistic regarding the probability of success and the fraction of future
cash flows), the decision is aﬀected more. For conjectures on the left
(right) side an increase in fuzziness decreases (increases) the perceived
value of the patent. As a consequence, for left-side challengers imprecise
information makes waiting less valuable, and litigation occurs earlier;
for right-side challengers waiting becomes more valuable, and litigation
occurs later. On average, in view of the asymmetric shape of the crit-
ical value, litigation tends to be postponed. These results are aligned
with the literature on real options and ambiguity aversion and contrast
with the eﬀects of volatility of standard real options, where an increase
in volatility always leads to an increase in the value of the investment
opportunity.
In summary, the following testable implications can be found: (i)
higher p, θ lead to more litigation (in keeping with [21]); (ii) the greater
the fuzziness over the patent "strength" - probability of patent validity
(p) and patent scope (θ)- the more delayed becomes litigation; (iii) the
greater the fuzziness over the profit flow obtained with the patent the
less likely becomes litigation (in keeping with [19]). It appears in empir-
ical research ([7]) that industries characterized by complex technologies
(e.g. electronics, computers; see [13]) or by less precise claims (software)
have higher litigation rates than industries where patents have very well-
defined boundaries (e.g. chemical compounds, pharmaceuticals). Since
it is expected that p and θ are larger if patent boundaries are fuzzier,
our results seem to be consistent with this empirical evidence too.
[insert Figures 1-6 here]
4 Conclusion
The notion of probabilistic patents requires a deep understanding of
patent risk and an appropriate way of modelling the diﬀerent sources
of uncertainty, regarding both the commercial significance of the inven-
tion being patented and the validity and scope of the legal right being
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granted. Recent debates on the appropriate methods for calculating
infringement damages have engaged the patent community: actually,
patent litigation is one piece of the patent reform puzzle. In this pa-
per we provide a valuation formula for patents within a framework that
combines a real option to litigate with a fuzzy methodology and give
a specific characterization of legal uncertainty. Our model is consistent
with the view that the strength of patent protection and the presence
of more codified and defined boundaries are crucial determinants of the
patent value, the probability of licensing and patent validity.
A comprehensive model and the resulting valuation formula can have
significant implications for patent policies. To the extent that the eﬀects
of uncertainty and enforcement are neglected in patent policy, incentives
for innovation may become inconsistent, issues of patent invalidity ar-
bitrary and the economic cost of patent litigation will be exacerbated.
The contribution of uncertainty to total patent value and its eﬀect on the
litigation decisions need to be taken into account to set a good patent
system and make it an eﬀective tool for providing positive incentives.
In this paper we have pointed out a few relevant diﬀerences with
respect to traditional real option modelling of patents. These are due to
imprecise information about the driving parameters, that is, the proba-
bility of successful litigation, the gains from successful infringement suits
or patent challenges, the litigation costs. A realistic estimate of these
parameter values, which our model makes possible, is necessary to ensure
that patent policy will be eﬀective.
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